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Abstract
This study examines the long-term effects of expansion through mergers and 
acquisitions in Brazil and South Africa. Firms from these emerging markets 
are among the most active globally in terms of utilising acquisitions as 
a growth strategy. We use an unbalanced panel of listed firms in Brazil and 
South Africa over the period 1980 to 2014, and employ the System Generalised 
Method of Moments estimation technique in order to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity and potential endogeneity problems. For both countries, the 
results obtained suggest there is persistence in profits and that organic growth 
pays off immediately – but size does not have a bearing on profits. Acquisitions 
are damaging in the short-term for South African firms, but have no influence on 
Brazilian firms. In both countries, there is no evidence of a permanent penalty 
for becoming an acquirer. While leverage and experience in acquisitions impact 
negatively on the profits of South African acquirers, they do not have any effect 
on the profits of Brazilian acquirers. 
Keywords: Profitability; merger; acquisitions; leverage; emerging markets. 
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1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (henceforth M&As) have been extensively researched 
in corporate finance (e.g. Tunyi and Ntim, 2016; Morellec and Zhdanov, 2005). 
However, the long-term performance of acquiring firms remains a contentious 
issue. M&As continue to be a dominant expansion strategy worldwide, in 
spite of disagreement about whether they create value or not (Petmezas, 2009; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). M&As present a 
contemporary challenge to managers in that most acquisitions do not create 
meaningful shareholder value (nearly 70%), and yet building a world-class 
company through organic growth is almost impossible (Harding and Rovit, 
2013). Studies, mainly from developed countries, show that acquisitions are not 
always a good way of creating shareholder value for acquirers. The prevalent 
understanding is that the gains from acquisitions tend to accrue to the target’s 
shareholders (Caves, 1988; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1987). Despite this empirical finding, M&A activity does not show signs of 
slowing down. The worldwide trend (see Appendix 1) is that the value of M&As 
between 1995 and 2012 was consistently above 800 billion US dollars ($) per 
year. According to Statista.com (2016), the approximate value of global M&A 
transactions grew from $1.71 trillion in 2009 to $4.28 trillion in 2015.
The lack of consensus stems from the numerous approaches used to evaluate 
post-M&As corporate performance. The three broad methods have been: the 
stock market approach (also known as the event study approach), the accounting 
approach, and the clinical approach. A major criticism of these methods is 
their focus on the short-term returns to M&As. In an attempt to overcome the 
weaknesses of the stock market, accounting, and clinical approaches, and to 
assess the long-run performance of M&As of UK-quoted companies, Dickerson, 
Gibson, and Tsakalotos (1997) used panel data regression analysis. This 
study builds on the work of Dickerson et al. (1997) by employing the System 
Generalised Method of Moments (System GMM), an estimation technique that 
takes into account the unobserved firm heterogeneity, potential endogeneity, 
and serial correlation problems. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the 
first to carry out these analyses. 
We use data from listed firms, both acquirers and non-acquirers, in Brazil 
and South Africa over the period 1980 to 2014. We use firms from Brazil and 
South Africa as being representative of firms in emerging markets. In addition, 
these two countries are part of BRICS, an economic block encompassing Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which has accelerated its involvement in 
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outward M&As (Du and Boateng, 2012). In 2012, BRICS firms accounted for 
over 60% of M&A activities in emerging markets (TMF, 2013). 
In this study, we use two countries for comparison. South Africa and Brazil 
have several features in common: they are upper middle-income countries at 
a similar stage of development, grappling with high income inequality and 
unemployment challenges. Both countries have well-developed financial 
markets, serving economies that are largely dependent on resources and 
manufacturing. Finally, both countries are well-integrated by trade and financial 
flows into their regions and the world.  
This study contributes in a number of ways to the literature on the long-term 
operating performance of acquirers. First, we offer new evidence on the impact 
of M&As on the profitability of acquirers in emerging markets (South Africa 
and Brazil) using regression analysis. None of the existing studies provide 
any emerging market evidence, despite the fact that firms from emerging 
markets are increasingly playing a significant role as acquirers. Second, from 
a methodological perspective, the current work improves on previous work by 
using a dynamic panel data model. This approach offers several advantages. It 
allows us to control for the existence of unobservable heterogeneity, as firms 
are tracked over time. We can examine a partial adjustment model that allows 
us to test whether there is any persistence in the profits of emerging market 
firms. Finally, this study differs from previous ones, in that it employs the 
System GMM estimation technique in order to take care of the endogeneity 
problem between profit and some of the regressors, and also the problem of 
autocorrelation which is prevalent in dynamic panel estimations. Our results 
show no evidence that acquisitions have a net beneficial effect on Brazilian and 
South African acquirers’ operating performance, as measured by profitability. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents an overview 
of the M&As in the Brazilian and South African corporate context. Section 
3 provides the theoretical framework of M&As from finance and economics 
perspectives. In Section 4, we review the empirical literature, and also develop 
our hypotheses. The data and methodology are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
presents and discusses the estimation results, robustness checks, and limitations 
of the analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. M&As in the Brazilian and South African corporate contexts
Since 1990, developing country acquirers have become increasingly active in 
seeking to enhance their comparative advantage, often looking for opportunities 
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outside their home-country borders. Between 1990 and 2007, South African 
firms were the second most frequent acquirers, after Malaysia, in terms of the 
number of cross-border transactions, and the third biggest in terms of deal value 
after Mexico and Brazil (Chernykh, Liebenberg and Macias, 2010; Tunyi and 
Ntim, 2016). South Africa is number one on the list of countries in Africa, with 
regard not only to M&A activity and but also its greatest potential for investment, 
because the country is considered to be a more familiar and mature business 
environment. In addition, its wealth of natural resources opens South Africa to 
attractive proposals and investments, making South African firms the targets 
of acquirers. According to the Mergermarket Report (2013), South Africa was 
responsible for a sizeable portion of African M&As, and was the target in half 
of the top 10 deals of 2012. Of the 188 deals with a total value of $33 billion 
that took place in Africa, South Africa contributed 97 deals with a market value 
of $11.1 billion.
In Brazil, M&As activity has increased since the 2000s, largely driven by 
its economic growth, development of private equity, increasing interest from 
foreign buyers, and improved access to credit (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). 
After slowing during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, M&As activity 
has intensified markedly, largely driven by two main factors (Pearson, 2016). 
First, the 2014/2015 recession, which was Brazil’s worst since 1901, heaped 
pressure on home-grown companies, resulting in some companies selling 
non-core businesses. Second, the depreciation of the Brazilian currency (the 
Real) made Brazilian assets more affordable to foreign investors. Furthermore, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2016) argues that Brazil’s sizeable and diverse 
economy, the seventh largest in the world, offers unique opportunities to foreign 
investors, such as a vast domestic consumer market, an emerging middle class, 
and ample natural resources.
While acquirers from developed countries have been attracted to exploiting 
rich resources in emerging economies, firms in emerging markets like Brazil 
and South Africa have also been increasingly active in both domestic and 
cross-border M&As. Aybar and Ficici (2009) observe that cross-border M&As 
activities from emerging market countries have paralleled economic reforms 
and their integration into the world economy. In these cross-border M&As, 
firms from emerging markets seek targets in developed economies to cope with 
increased competition, in order to gain access to foreign markets and to expand 
their global positions. Furthermore, cross-border M&As into developed markets 
offer the benefits of technology and expertise, as well as loosening the grip of 
institutional and domestic market constraints. Expansion through cross-border 
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M&As has also helped firms from emerging countries to overcome their late-
comer disadvantage in the global market (Lebedev, Peng, Xie and Stevens, 
2014; Somdaka, 2014).
Despite the seemingly high value and number of M&As involving firms from 
developing countries like Brazil and South Africa, little is known about their 
long-run effects (Tunyi and Ntim, 2016). The need for answers to the question 
of whether these transactions create value for shareholders is amplified by the 
increasing role of emerging market firms as acquirers (formerly mainly targets) 
in the global M&As landscape (Tunyi and Ntim, 2016). The few studies on the 
post-acquisition performance of firms over longer periods have failed to find 
consistent evidence of improvements in shareholder value creation (Gregory, 
1997; Limmack, 1991; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003).
3. Theoretical framework
There are various theoretical and strategic reasons used by firms to justify 
embarking on acquisitions. Regardless of the motive, at the firm level there 
remains a lack of consensus about the impact on the acquirer’s performance in 
terms of profitability, shareholder wealth, research and development, resource 
redeployment, management effectiveness, and a variety of other indicators of 
value creation. At a broader level, the expansion of firms through acquisitions 
creates welfare concerns in cases where acquirers and targets are linked vertically 
or horizontally, and where competition may be limited.
The discussion about the effects of acquisitions on company performance 
involves many perspectives, spanning the fields of economics, finance, 
management and human resources. This study focuses on the long-run effects 
of acquisitions on the acquiring firms’ profits, and adopts a perspective 
predominantly from the realm of finance and economics. In neoclassical theory, 
firm growth is merely incidental to its profit maximisation and the achievement 
of its optimal size objective. Modern theories of firm behaviour provide a more 
explicit role for firm strategy (Marris, 1964; Penrose, 1959). Penrose (1959) 
assumes that firms seek to maximise the total size of profits in the long run, 
which is equated with growth maximisation through investment in all positive 
net present value projects. Marris (1964) argues that growth is an explicit 
objective of the firm’s management because of the benefits it brings (e.g. empire 
building power, prestige, larger salaries). Management’s focus on growth in 
physical size of their firms, at the expense profit maximisation, conflicts with 
the shareholder wealth maximisation goal. 
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 Firms can grow in two ways: internal (organic) expansion and expansion 
through mergers and acquisitions. Each of the two options for expansion has 
pros and cons. Growth through internal expansion can be slower and can 
present its own cost. In contrast, M&As can be a fast way to achieve growth 
(Gaughan, 2005). Internal growth constrains firms from taking advantage of 
unexploited market opportunities, in contrast to quicker growth through M&As. 
M&As also enable firms to diversify to related markets and to leverage their 
current capabilities (Bhagat, Malhotra and Zhu, 2011; Gaughan, 2005). From 
a business perspective, M&As often remove duplication, reduce costs, and 
produce synergies (LaMattina, 2011). 
Caves (1988) outlines three advantages and three disadvantages of growth 
through acquisitions. The first advantage is the ability of a firm to realise returns 
soon after the investment is made, as the target firm is already in operation. Second, 
adding an already functioning business (with a working staff complement) to 
the firm may relax the managerial constraint to growth. Third, acquisitions may 
offer the firm opportunities for internal expansion (Cable, 1977), which could 
enhance organic growth. A major disadvantage of growth through acquisitions 
is that a firm forgoes the opportunity to tailor the investment to its exact needs 
and desires. Further, troubled and inefficiently run firms are more likely to be 
acquisition targets and hence the acquirer’s return may be smaller and may be 
achieved more slowly. The challenges of integrating the internal structures and 
cultures of different-functioning firms is another disadvantage of acquisitions. 
Dickerson et al. (1997:346) conclude that most firms are likely to employ both 
expansion strategies and use the (usual) economic equilibrium rule, that is, 
a firm will “acquire up to the point where discounted marginal returns from 
the acquisition are equal to the discounted marginal returns from investment 
internally”. However, it is not always best to pursue growth, because some firms 
may have reached their most efficient size: in this case, engaging in M&As can 
reduce efficiency and lower profits.
Pre-acquisition, target firms tend to have low productivity and hence they 
experience improvements afterwards. The initial productivity of the acquiring 
firm and whether a main or a peripheral division is buying or selling the plants 
are important factors determining the extent of the improvements, but when 
considered together with the timing of sales and industry shocks, the pattern 
is consistent with improved resource allocation and profit maximisation 
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). With regard to diversifying acquisitions, 
Schoar (2002) offers a more nuanced perspective by portraying these transactions 
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as a mechanism for transferring efficiency from the more efficient industries of 
acquirers to the less efficient industries of their targets. Plants of diversified 
firms tend to be seven times more productive than those of firms operating in a 
single industry. However, when firms become more diversified, they experience 
a fall in average productivity, which Schoar attributes to a “new toy effect”: a 
shift in focus by management on the newly acquired businesses at the expense 
of existing plants. Evidence presented by Schoar (2002) supports the view taken 
by Caves (1988), and paints a more detailed picture of the pre-acquisitions and 
post-acquisition behaviour of both acquirers and targets.
4. Empirical literature review and development of hypotheses 
Most evidence about the performance of acquisitions still stems from market 
valuations and event studies and takes a short-term view of gains, with few 
attempts to shift the focus to a longer-term perspective and take the economics 
approach, as suggested by Caves (1988). This paper attempts to bring the latter 
kind of enquiry into an emerging markets’context.
 Several factors play a role in the direction and degree of impact of 
acquisitions on acquirers and targets. Tuch and O'Sullivan (2007) see the early 
work of Asquith (1983) and Malatesta (1983), which found that takeovers may 
have a negative impact on the long-run wealth of shareholders, as a motivation 
and departure point of recent works in this area. Long-run event studies have 
found that, on average, acquisitions generate insignificant or abnormal negative 
returns in the long run (Alexandridis, Antoniou and Zhao, 2006; Conn, Cosh, 
Guest and Hughes, 2005; Gregory, 1997; Limmack, 1991). However, the 
payment method used is likely to matter in determining any abnormal returns. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that acquirers that embark on stock (equity)-
funded transactions experience negative returns, while those using the cash-
payment option benefit from positive returns. There are also differences for 
target firms, as holdings of acquirer stock do not result in positive excess 
returns for targets. Another factor in cross-border acquisitions is the acquirer’s 
and target’s home country; for example, emerging market acquirers tend to 
experience positive announcement returns if the target is a firm in a developed 
country, but the benefits accrue only to the target firm if both are emerging 
market firms (Chernykh et al., 2010). 
Research on post-acquisition performance using accounting information 
has been used to measure the long-run impact of acquisitions on the grounds 
that any benefits arising from acquisitions will eventually appear in the firm’s 
accounting records, in spite of the limitations of accounting data (such as 
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possible manipulation of accounting information by managers, and changes in 
accounting policies). The findings on post-acquisition operating performance 
using conventional accounting measures are somewhat mixed, although there 
is generally no clear evidence of improved post-acquisition performance (Tuch 
and O'Sullivan, 2007). Considering the largest 50 mergers between 1979 and 
1984, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) conclude that acquirers experience 
improvements in asset productivity, leading to higher operating cash flows 
relative to their industry peers. Similarly, in their analysis of approximately 2000 
mergers between 1973 and 1998, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) find 
that post-merger operating margins improved relative to industry benchmarks. 
Lu (2004), however, finds a negative adjusted industry post-bid return on assets 
and returns on equity for acquirers.
Brouthers, van Hastenburg, and van den Ven (1998) believe that the 
disappointing results post-merger could be explained by the fact that most of 
these studies do not measure performance against the merger motives, that is, the 
reasons why acquisitions were undertaken. They also contend that mergers are 
undertaken to achieve several objectives and therefore one measure may not be 
adequate to capture post-merger performance. They conclude that in most cases 
mergers result in the overall improvement of a firm’s performance, and when 
evaluated using multiple success measures, mergers are generally successful.
4.1. Persistence in profits
It is not in dispute that acquirers tend to be in a better financial position than 
targets, and that they are firms with advantages that allow them to enjoy 
profitability (such as market power or access to superior technology) which 
protect their flow of future benefits from the threat of entry through imitation 
and innovation. Their efforts tend to pay off, but become less effective over 
longer periods (Goddard and Wilson, 1999; Mueller, 1992). Geroski and 
Jacquemin (1988:375) encapsulate the literature on persistence in profits thus: 
“… whatever it is that determines profitability seems to differ across firms but is 
relatively stable over time. This is, in part, why predicting the future profitability 
of specific firms using information on their past profitability is not too difficult”.
4.2. Impact of growth through M&As on profitability
Growth (whether organic or through acquisitions) is a very important factor for the 
success of a firm (Kouser, Bano, Azeem and Hassan, 2012). Firms have popularly 
adopted growth through M&As to achieve corporate growth and other corporate 
objectives (Thanos and Papadakis, 2012). Dickerson et al. (1997) suggest that 
each type of growth has different effects on firm profitability, pointing out that 
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“if a firm doubles its growth rate internally, the firm’s profitability increases by 
almost 6.9% compared to only a 0.2% increase if it grows through acquisitions” 
(Dickerson et al., 1997:357). 
4.3. Impact of leverage on profitability
The literature on capital structure suggests that in an imperfect market, the 
amount of debt in a firm’s capital represents an important means by which value 
is created for shareholders (Agyei-Boapeah, 2015). Leverage is linked to M&As: 
these expensive strategies are sometimes externally financed because they may 
require additional resources beyond what is generated from normal operations 
(Harrison, Hart and Oler, 2014; Kumar, 1985). The existence of debt should 
improve the post-acquisition performance of acquirers in line with free cash-
flow theory by Jensen (1986). Debt attracts interest and limits free cash flow, thus 
inducing managers to put to use available free cash effectively and efficiently 
(Harrison et al., 2014; Sharma and Ho, 2002). Hence, employing externally-
raised funds leads to a more efficient use of funds and higher profitability than 
internal funding (Kumar, 1985). Harrison et al. (2014) examined the relationship 
between leverage for acquirers, targets and post-acquisition performance, and 
found that leverage has a negative impact on post-acquisition performance 
of acquirers. The negative performance is clustered in acquiring firms, which 
are already highly geared. They concluded that M&As have a significant and 
persistent impact on the capital structure of acquirers, causing a continuous 
increase in average debt-to-assets of acquirers in post-acquisition periods of up 
to five years.
4.4. Impact of acquisition on firm size
Post-acquisition performance can be influenced by the size of the acquirer. 
Empirical studies suggest that smaller  firms perform better in M&As than 
large firms. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) put forward the reason 
that incentives for managers are more in line with shareholders of smaller 
firms, whereas this is not the case for larger companies. Kumar (1985) noted 
that beyond a certain point, an increase in a firm’s growth rate may go with 
increased cost. This means that the more acquirers engage in acquisitions, the 
more the effect on subsequent performance differs systematically (Kumar, 
1985). Evidence from Klimek (2014) on the financial effects of M&As on 
acquiring firms in Poland, shows that growth in firm size is negatively correlated 
with operating performance. However, Moeller et al. (2004) find that firm size 
has a positive and significant effect on profitability, in line with the findings of 
Dickerson et al. (1997). 
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4.5. Impact of multiple acquisitions on profitability
Analysing the performance of Russian acquirers, Bertrand and Betschinger 
(2012) find evidence that, on average, acquisitions reduce the return on assets 
(ROA). Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) studied the returns to shareholders 
of firms that acquired five or more public, private, or subsidiary targets, and 
concluded that returns to acquirers are greater when a target is a private firm, 
but lower when the target is a public firm. Variation in returns to acquirers is 
also linked to the characteristics of the target, types of targets, and the methods 
of financing acquisitions (Fuller et al., 2002). One explanation for the variation 
in returns between acquiring a public firm relative to a private firm, is that 
acquirers purchase private firms at a discount (that is, at a better price), because 
a private firm cannot be easily bought and sold compared to a public firm, thus 
making private firms less attractive (Fuller et al., 2002). However, this result is 
complicated by size effects: the greater the relative size of private target firms, 
the more positive the returns to acquirers; and the greater the relative size of a 
public target firm, the more negative the returns to acquirers. 
4.6. Impact of previous M&As experience on profitability 
In general, it has been found that previous M&As experience increases the 
likelihood of subsequent acquisitions (Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006; 
Lebedev et al., 2014). Empirical studies show that firms from developing countries 
enter developed markets incrementally, and their accumulated experience helps 
them to overcome the liability of foreignness (Lebedev et al., 2014). Experience 
from past M&As deals may facilitate the process for identification and integration 
of target firm resources, which may be required to improve post-acquisition 
performance of acquirers (Hitt, Ireland and Harrison, 2001; King, Dalton, Daily 
and Covin, 2004). For instance, previous M&As experience has a positive 
impact on the returns of acquirers from China (Chen and Lin, 2009). Bertrand 
and Betschinger (2012) show that for Russian acquirers, there is a negative 
cumulative impact of a greater number of acquisitions, reflecting that that even 
though previous domestic M&As experience has value, it seems that such 
experience is difficult to transfer across borders for international acquisitions. 
Lack of previous M&As experience and prior absence in the country of the target 
firm, may limit the benefits to the acquirer (Aybar and Ficici, 2009). Furthermore, 
a geographically and culturally proximate target does not enhance an acquirer’s 
prospect of success (Aybar and Ficici, 2009).
4.7. Hypotheses
In light of the empirical literature and the contexts of Brazil and South Africa, 
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our expectations regarding the relationships shaping the performance of 
acquirers are:
H1: Lagged profit (πit-1) has a positive effect on the current profitability of 
Brazilian and South African acquirers (there is persistence in the profits of 
acquirers). 
H2: There is a negative relationship between size (SIZEj) and profit (πit).
H3: There is a negative relationship between leverage (LEVit) and πit.
H4: There is a positive relationship between internal growth (Git) and πit. The 
study includes a distributed lag θ(L) to allow for any delayed effects of a 
company’s internal growth on performance.
H5: There is a positive relationship between the distributed lag of growth 
θ(L)Git  and πit.
H6: There is a negative relationship between multiple acquisitions and πit.
H7: There is a positive relationship between previous M&As experience and 
πit.
5. Research design
The data used in the study were obtained from the Bloomberg databank and 
includes 321 companies listed on South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) and 353 companies listed on Brazil’s São Paulo Stock Exchange, for 
which information was available. The data cover the period from 1980 to 2014 
in the form of an unbalanced panel. 
Table 1 (below) presents the construction and the descriptive statistics 
for the variables in this study. The data reveal that the mean operating profit 
margin is 2% and -3% for South African firms and Brazilian firms, respectively. 
These values generally indicate a low level of operating profit for firms in both 
countries. There are important differences between the extent of debt financing 
by South African firms and Brazilian firms. The mean leverage ratios show that 
Brazilian firms use more debt to finance their assets (47%) than South African 
firms (19%). The average total numbers of acquisitions for South African and 
Brazilian firms are three and four, respectively, indicating that there is a small 
difference between firms engaging in M&As. This is further confirmed by the 
mean total acquisitions per year, which are 0.18 and 0.17 for South African and 
Brazilian firms, respectively.  
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Respectively, only 37% and 43% of companies listed on the JSE and São 
Paulo Stock Exchange, for which information was available, were non-
acquirers (Table 2). On both exchanges, most of the acquirers embarked on 
between two and five acquisitions. However, 15 JSE-listed firms showed a 
greater appetite, and made between 16 and 50 acquisitions, while 32 São Paulo 
Stock Exchange-listed firms had the same appetite over the study period.
taBle 2: aCquiSitionS' aCtivity By jSe and São paulo StoCK exChanGe-liSted FirmS
 
South Africa - JSE Brazil - São Paulo Stock 
Exchange




Per cent Number of 
companies
Per cent
0 262 37.38 243 43.39
1 139 19.83 95 16.96
2 to 5 216 30.81 133 23.75
6 to 10 49 6.99 36 6.44
11 to 15 18 2.58 15 2.67
16 to 20 6 0.85 15 2.68
21 to 30 6 0.86 11 1.97
31 to 50 3 0.42 6 1.08
51 to 90 2 0.28 4 0.72
91 to 115 - - 2 0.36
Total (n) 701 100.00 560 100.00
Source: Author’s calculations using an unbalanced panel over the period 1980 to 2014. Data 
obtained from the Bloomberg databank.
The paper follows the methodology proposed by Dickerson et al. (1997). The 
basic equation is given by:
                          (1)
The dependent variable is the profitability of company i at time t, which 
is measured by the operating income (profit before interest and tax) divided 
by the average of the opening and closing values of total assets for the period 
(average assets). This measure of profitability reflects the gross rate of return 
on average total assets. The coefficient on lagged profits indicates the degree 
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of persistence in profits. The relative firm size (SIZE) is captured by dummy 
variables for the quintiles of total (net) assets. These dummies reflect the size 
of the firm relative to the distribution of total assets among all firms listed on 
the country’s stock exchange in that year, and hence a firm’s position may 
change over time. Leverage is measured by the sum of short-term and long-term 
borrowing as a ratio of total assets at the end of the period. The growth variable, 
Git, is the growth of total (net) assets. Company-fixed effects are captured by αi, 
which acknowledges the intrinsic differences between companies that result in 
unobserved heterogeneity. The time-fixed effects are captured by γt and include 
the effects of the business cycle and other time-specific events on company 
performance, and εit is the error term.
The estimation of the model in equation (1) and its modifications presents a 
number of problems. First, the time-invariant characteristics intrinsic to each 
company need to be incorporated. Second, if fixed effects estimators are used in 
a dynamic panel model, these are likely to be biased, especially for short runs 
of data. Fortunately, the bias falls for longer runs, i.e. when T rises the bias is 
proportional to 1/T (Nickell, 1981). Even though we do not use fixed effects, 
in keeping with our focus on the long-term effects of acquisitions, we include 
only companies with at least 10 years of data in the estimation. The average 
T for this subsample of 240 companies is 16.58 years for South Africa. For 
Brazil, it is 33.86 years for subsample of 335 companies. Third, the current 
growth and leverage variables are likely to be endogenous. Firms expand their 
operations in order to enhance profitability, and also profits can be used to grow 
a firm’s asset base. Similarly, leverage facilitates improved profitability, and 
profits make borrowing easier. Hence, the lagged values of growth and leverage, 
together with further lags of profits, are used as instruments for current growth 
and current leverage.
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose an estimator which uses differencing to 
eliminate the fixed effects bias in dynamic panel models, and which exploits 
further moment conditions in order to instrument for the lagged dependent 
variable, also allowing for instrumentation of other endogenous variables. This 
estimator is often referred to as the Difference Generalised Method of Moments 
(Difference GMM). One drawback of the Difference GMM is that the use of 
dummy variables becomes somewhat problematic. In addition, in unbalanced 
panels this method is not ideal because it tends to have problems with missing 
observations by magnifying gaps in unbalanced panels. We therefore use the 
alternative estimation technique, the System GMM, suggested by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The System GMM augments the 
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Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator by further assuming that “first differences 
of instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects” (Roodman, 
2006:1). 
The basic model in equation (1) is modified in three ways, once again 
following the approach of Dickerson et al. First, Model 2 adds a shift dummy 
variable. The dummy variable changes from 0 to 1 when a firm completes its 
first acquisition and remains at 1 in all subsequent periods. The coefficient of this 
shift dummy is intended to measure a potential persistent change in profits when 
a firm becomes an acquirer. Dickerson et al. (1997:352) refer to this as “any 
permanent effect resulting from acquisition” and note that this rough definition 
of acquirer does not distinguish between firms that use this expansion method 
with varying frequency. Hence, the results are likely to be biased towards a 
smaller “permanent effect”. 
Table 3 shows that JSE-listed firms recorded up to 18 acquisitions in a given 
year, but most frequently the number of acquisitions was one to three per 
year. Like South African firms, São Paulo Stock Exchange-listed firms mainly 
undertook between one and three acquisitions per year. However, in the extreme, 
they showed greater appetite for acquisitions, recording up to 37 acquisitions in 
a year. 
taBle 3: aCquiSitionS per year By jSe and São paulo StoCK exChanGe-liSted FirmS
South Africa – JSE Brazil – São Paulo Stock 
Exchange
Number of acquisitions 
per firm per year
Frequency Per cent Frequency Per cent
0 9740 89.92 11924 93.4
1 702 6.48 419 3.28
2 to 3 308 2.84 261 2.04
4 to 5 59 0.54 79 0.62
6 to 7 15 0.14 33 0.26
8 to 9 5 0.05 16 0.13
10 to 11 2 0.02 14 0.11
12 to 18 1 0.01 15 0.12
19 to 37 - - 5 0.05
Total (N) 10832 100.00 12766 100.00
Source: Author’s calculations using an unbalanced panel for the period 1991 to 2014. Data 
obtained from the Bloomberg databank. 
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The second modification of the basic model (Model 3) is the inclusion 
of an impulse dummy variable, which takes on the value of 1 in any period 
when at least one acquisition is made, and 0 otherwise. The impulse dummy 
is an attempt to measure the transient effects of acquisitions. It has its own 
limitations, because firms that are multiple acquirers are not distinguished from 
firms that embark on a single transaction. The impulse dummy can also be 
used to gauge the probability of making acquisitions in the subsequent year, 
given whether the firm undertook at least one acquisition in the current year. 
The transition probabilities are presented in Table 4 (below). Table 4 shows 
that given no acquisitions are made in a given year, the probability of at least 
one acquisition in the following year are about 6% and 4% in South Africa and 
Brazil, respectively. The probability of acquisitions’ activity continuing in the 
following year, given that the company was active in the current year, is 46% 
in South Africa and 58% in Brazil. Hence, there are some persistence effects 
regarding acquisitions, perhaps supporting the waves of activity observed in 
developed countries, and these effects appear to be very strong for emerging 
markets like South Africa and Brazil.
Model 4 retains the shift dummy and adds a variable measuring the number of 
acquisitions per period with the aim of gauging the short-term impact of multiple 
transactions. Model 5 adds a variable, which measures the cumulative number 
of acquisitions over time, in order to assess any benefits or costs accruing to 
more experienced acquirers.
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taBle 4: tranSition proBaBilitieS oF maKinG at leaSt one aCquiSition in the next year
South Africa – JSE Brazil - São Paulo Stock Exchange
No 
acquisitions 
made in the 
next year 
(A1t+1 = 0)
At least one 
acquisition 





made in the 
next year 
(A1t+1 = 0)
At least one 
acquisition 






made in the 
current year 
(A1t = 0)
Number 10,714 197 10,911 7,600 242 7,842
Percentage 94.42 5.58 100 95.83 4.17 100
At least one 
acquisition 
made in the 
current year 
(A1t = 1)
0 1,295 1295 0 2,289 2,289
Number 53.80 46.20 100 42.37 57.63 100
Percentage
Total Number 10,714 1,492 12,206 7,600 2,531 10,131
Percentage 90.80 9.20 100 91.63 8.37 100
Source: Author’s calculations using an unbalanced panel over the period 1980 to 2014. Data 
obtained from the Bloomberg databank. 
6. Empirical results and discussion
The results from the system GMM regressions for all five models for each of 
the two countries are presented in Table 5 (below). The instruments used for 
the endogenous leverage and growth variables are  lagged values of leverage, 
further lags of growth , together with further  lags of the dependent variable, 
profit. We use lags 3 to 5 for South Africa and lags 2 to 5 for Brazil. 
The presence of the nth-order serial correlation in the instruments was tested 
using the m(n) test, in which the test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a 
standard normal variable under the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals. The results in Table 5 show that the null 
hypothesis should not be rejected as there is no serial correlation of order 2 for 
both Brazil and South Africa. The legitimacy of the instruments was verified 
using the Hansen test, which tests for over-identifying restrictions. The results 
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in Table 5 show that the null hypothesis that the population moment conditions 
are correct (as shown by the Hansen test) is not rejected for both Brazil and 
South Africa.
6.1. Lagged profit
Our results in Table 5 highlight several features. The coefficients on lagged profit 
show that there is a degree of persistence in profits, which is consistent with 
theoretical expectations and other empirical studies (Caves, 1988; Dickerson 
et al., 1997; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988). In both Brazil and South Africa, 
the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant at 1%. The 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are above 0.56 higher than the 
coefficient of 0.5 obtained by both Dickerson et al. (1997) and Geroski and 
Jacquemin (1988), but not out of line with the short-run persistence in profits 
value of 0.59 obtained by Goddard and Wilson (1999) for a panel of UK firms. 
The effect seems larger for Brazil than for South Africa, with coefficients 
of the lagged dependent variable being 0.64 and 0.57 for the two countries, 
respectively. 
6.2. Leverage
Consistent with the evidence from previous studies, such as Dickerson et al. 
(1997) in a study of UK-listed firms, and Harrison et al. (2014), our results 
reflect  that leverage has a large negative effect on the operating performance 
of South African acquirers, as hypothesised. In Brazil, leverage has a negative 
coefficient, as hypothesised; however, it is statistically insignificant in all five 
models. The finding on leverage is interesting because Brazilian firms are almost 
two and half times more leveraged than South African firms. This means that 
they financed almost half of their assets with debt and yet high debt levels do not 
appear to have a negative effect on their profitability. 
6.3. Size
The coefficients of the size quintiles are positive and negative for Brazil and 
South Africa, respectively, although statistically insignificant. This suggests that 
in both Brazil and South Africa, size has an insignificant impact on profitability, 
contrary our hypothesis and the findings of Dickerson et al. (1997) for the UK, 
where size followed an inverted-U relationship with profit. The results are also 
not consistent with the findings of Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) for Russian 
acquirers, and Singh and Mogla (2008) for Indian acquirers. This probably 
warrants further investigation into the size of the acquiring firms in Brazil and 
84
South Africa, compared to the sizes of non-acquirers, echoing the observation 
by Asquith (1983) that the relative size of the target to the acquirer has an impact 
on the acquirer’s gains.
6.4. Growth
Growth has a positive impact on profits in both countries suggesting that high 
growth leads to higher profits. Dickerson et al. (1997) explain that firms expanding 
through internal processes tend to be more dynamic. While current growth has 
a large and significant coefficient, lagged growth is statistically insignificant in 
both countries. This finding suggests that internal growth pays off immediately, 
and does not have persistent effects. These results provide some support to 
agency theory, which argues that left to their own devices, managers may focus 
on short-term projects which boost their image in the market place; sacrificing 
long-term projects that maximise shareholder wealth in the process. On the other 
hand, negative growth also appears not to have a lasting effect on profits. 
6.5. Impact of becoming an acquirer, previous M&As experience, and multiple 
acquisitions
In Model 2, we report the results of the shift dummy, “acquisition transition”. 
The shift dummy switches from 0 to 1 when a firm becomes an acquirer for the 
first time over the observed period, and remains at 1 thereafter. The shift dummy 
is statistically insignificant for both countries, reporting negative and positive 
coefficients for Brazil and South Africa respectively. This indicates that there is 
no statistically significant difference in the operating performance of acquirers, 
compared to non-acquirers in the period after the acquirers have completed their 
first transaction.
Model 3 highlights the immediate effects of embarking on at least one 
acquisition in a given year (as reflected by the impulse dummy A1, which takes 
a value of 1 in the year of any acquisition(s) and a value of 0 otherwise). The 
impulse dummy has a significant negative effect on profits in both Brazil and 
South Africa, which suggests lower returns for both Brazilian and South African 
firms in periods when they embarked on acquisitions. 
In Model 4, we test the impact of the shift dummy and the number of 
acquisitions undertaken in a given year on profits. The number of acquisitions 
reduces profits in South Africa, which is consistent with the findings of Bertrand 
and Betschinger (2012). In Brazil, the coefficient on the number of acquisitions 
is negative, but statistically insignificant. We reported earlier in Table 2 that both 
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Brazilian and South African firms mainly undertook one to three acquisitions 
per year, although some Brazilian firms showed more appetite for acquisitions, 
recording up to 37 acquisitions in a year, compared to South African firms’ 
maximum of 18. This result is interesting because the number of acquisitions 
has no effect on the Brazilian firms, which showed a greater appetite for 
multiple transactions in a given year than their South African counterparts, but 
has a negative impact on South African firms. Possible explanations for this 
finding may have to do with the nature of acquisitions undertaken in these two 
countries; for example, or it may be of importance whether the acquisition was 
of a target in an unrelated industry, or in a horizontally- or vertically-related 
industry. In addition, the poor performance of acquirers can be caused by lack of 
previous M&As experience, particularly in foreign acquisitions (Bertrand and 
Betschinger, 2012; Klimek, 2014).
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taBle 5: Two STep-SySTem Gmm eSTimaTion ReSulTS  dependenT vaRiable: pRofiT (πit)
South Africa – JSE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Lagged
profit

















1.1789 (1.016) 1.1803 (1.0120) 1.1466 
(0.9456)
1.1951 (1.0123) 1.2206 (0.9928)
Size
quintile 2
0.2416 (0.8710) 0.2589 (0.8647) 0.2135 
(0.8538)
0.2541 (0.8606) 0.2304 (0.8711)
Size
quintile 3
0.5006 (0.5770) 0.5085 (0.5775) 0.5375 
(0.5698)
0.5436 (0.5751) 0.4717 (0.5758)
Size
quintile 4
0.5225 (0.6748) 0.5295 (0.6806) 0.4819 
(0.6726)
0.5203 (0.6772) 0.4935 (0.6813)
Size
quintile 5
0.7024 (0.7054) 0.6948 (0.7387) 0.6864 
(0.7205)
0.7353 (0.7353) 0.7214 (0.7454)
Acquisition 
transition
- 0.0939 (0.2196) 0.2637 
(0.2237)
0.2009 (0.2182) 0.2008 (0.2093)









- - - -0.0295 *(0.0169))
Intercept 0.2649 (0.642) 0.4664 (0.6298) 0.4891 
(0.6091)
0.2274 (0.6520) 0.2638 (0.6505)
m2 0.591 0.593 0.626 0.716 0.615
Hansen 23.63 (0.130) 23.88 (12.3) 23.73 (0.127) 22.89 (0.153) 22.46 (0.168)
df 17 17 17 17 17
N 3553 3553 3553 3553 3553
*, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Time dummy 
variables are not reported, to promote brevity.
Source: Author’s calculations using an unbalanced panel for the period 1980 to 2014. Data 
obtained from the Bloomberg databank.
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taBle 5: Two STep-SySTem Gmm eSTimaTion ReSulTS  dependenT vaRiable: pRofiT (πit) 
(Cont.)
Brazil - São Paulo Stock Exchange
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
0.636***(0.16) 0.636***(0.154) 0.637***(0.160) 0.637***(0.163) 0.641***(0.149)
-0.015(0.017) -0.017(0.017) -0.016(0.017) -0.015(0.017) -0.017(0.017)
7.136*(4.129) 7.077*(4.128) 7.592*(4.236) 7.549*(4.215) 7.022*(4.118)
2.322(2.222) 2.217(2.173) 2.352(2.200) 2.505(2.270) 2.083(2.101)
-3.021(2.650) -2.967(2.674) -3.077(2.650) -2.926(2.552) -2.865(2.623)
-2.764(2.360) -2.726(2.399) -2.834(2.379) -2.741(2.317) -2.674(2.377)
-2.798(2.369) -2.720(2.397) -2.693(2.301) -2.722(2.304) -2.678(2.382)
-2.528(2.239) -2.461(2.291) -2.618(2.300) -2.494(2.230) -2.447(2.286)
-0.298(0.230) 0.373(0.335) 0.067(0.224) -0.132(0.192)
- - -1.637*(0.985)
- - - -0.439(0.277) -
- - - -0.032(0.025)
1.331(1.415) 1.538(1.506) 1.591(1.558) 1.556(1.508) 1.693(1.603)
0.946 0.913 0.947 0.995 0.866
32.26 (0.223) 32.33 (0.224) 30.35 (0.298) 28.33 (0.394) 32.31 (0.221)
27 27 27 27 27
3729 3729 3729 3729 3729
In Model 5, we test the impact of the cumulative number of acquisitions on 
profit. It is reasonable to suppose that firms gain experience from embarking 
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on multiple acquisitions over time, and this lessens any negative effects. 
Our model tries to capture these effects by using the cumulative number of 
acquisitions as a proxy for experience in M&As. Contrary to expectations, we 
find that the coefficient on the cumulative number of acquisitions was negative 
and statistically significant for South Africa, and negative but statistically 
insignificant for Brazil.These results point towards the empire-building theory 
which suggests that managers may be concerned with expanding the business 
units (through M&As) under their control, rather than optimally allocating 
resources (engaging in value-enhancing M&As). 
6.6. Additional tests 1 and robustness checks
Additional tests were conducted on both countries. The payment method did 
not appear to have an impact: for example, the coefficient on the number of 
stock acquisitions was statistically insignificant with a positive coefficient in 
South Africa and a negative coefficient in Brazil. We further tested the impact 
of cumulative horizontal acquisitions2 (cumulative number of acquisitions in 
the same sector) on profit, and found this variable was negative and statistically 
insignificant in both countries. Robustness checks were conducted by using 
value-reporting models (using Tobin’s Q and the price-to-book ratio) and 
alternative profitability measures (operating profit margin and return on 
capital employed). No significant changes were reported on the coefficients of 
explanatory variables. 
6.7. Limitations and areas for further research
The use of accounting data for estimation is likely to present some well-known 
impediments, which include the potential for “creative accounting” by firms 
to reduce their tax bills, and also possible inconsistencies in the timing and 
methods of reflecting acquired assets in the companies’ books. Second, any out-
of-period acquisitions are not captured. Thus, making the distinction between 
acquirers and non-acquirers is only based on the available observations. These 
limitations offer a broad scope for further research. Third, a clearer picture may 
emerge if more features of the acquisitions are added – whether they are local 
or cross-border, whether the target is in an emerging or developed market, and 
whether the merger is a horizontal, vertical or diversifying transaction in terms 
1  We do not report these results in order to promote brevity. These results are available on 
request.
2  These tests were conducted for firms where data were available about the nature of the merger.
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of industry. Also, divergence of acquisitions’ returns between various industries 
is likely, and hence it warrants attention. Fourth, a different picture on post-
acquisition performance may emerge if the motive for the acquisition is added 
to the analysis; that is, whether the motives for the acquisition were economic, 
personal, or strategic. 
7. Summary and conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the effect of acquisitions on the 
profitability of South African and Brazilian acquirers using unbalanced panels 
of JSE-listed and São Paulo Stock Exchange-listed companies over the period 
1980-2014. The results obtained using the system GMM estimation technique 
are broadly consistent with the findings of Dickerson et al. (1997) for the United 
Kingdom. Our results show that there is persistence in the profits of listed firms, 
and that  growth seems to pay off immediately in both South Africa and Brazil. 
Firms in both countries experience a short-term negative shock to profits when 
embarking on at least one acquisition in a given year. The two countries differ 
with regard to the impact of leverage and experience in M&As. Leverage and 
experience in M&As impact the profitability of South African firms negatively, 
but do not have any effect on Brazilian firms’ performance. In both countries, 
we do not find evidence that size and method of payment have any effect on 
the acquirer’s profitability. We suggest that further research in this area be 
conducted by incorporating more details about the nature of each transaction 
in order to understand the driving forces behind the impact of M&As on the 
operating performance of acquirers.   
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